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 ABSTRACT 
 Ever since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the United States has been 
awakened to the threat that extremist organizations pose to our national security.    The greatest 
transnational terrorist threat to the United States right now comes primarily from extremist 
groups such as Al-Queda, Hamas, and Hezbollah.  These extremist groups are fueled by the 
desire to influence political, religious, and/or ideological causes.  The political “end-state” or 
objective of the extremist is to overthrow “heretic” governments which currently exist and 
replace them with Islamic governments based on the rule of the Shariah (the first book of the 
Quran which strongly regulates all aspects of life).  (Swanson, Territo, & Taylor, 2007, p. 87-89)     
The purpose of this thesis is to conduct a qualitative analysis of the sources of extremism from 
two different perspectives (United States government and local Muslims), determine if The 
National Intelligence Estimate 2007 properly identifies the sources of extremism, and make 
recommendations on how to counter the sources of extremism/radicalization and improve 
security and counterterrorism strategy.  The research questions which will guide this study 
include:  What are the primary sources of Islamic Extremism; what do the prominent authors in 
this field of study identify as sources of extremism; what do the National Intelligence Estimate 
2007 and other US government documents identify as the sources of Islamic extremism; and 
what does the local Muslim population identify as the sources/causes of extremism? 
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 CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY 
 Ever since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the United States has been 
awakened to the threat that Islamic extremist organizations pose to our national security.    The 
greatest transnational terrorist threat to the United States right now comes primarily from 
extremist groups such as Al-Queda, Hamas, and Hezbollah.  This form of terrorism is fueled by 
the desire to influence political, religious, and/or ideological causes.  The political “end-state” or 
objective of the extremist is to overthrow “heretic” governments which currently exist and 
replace them with Islamic governments based on the rule of the Shariah (the first book of the 
Koran which strongly regulates all aspects of life).  (Swanson, Territo, & Taylor, 2007, p. 87-89) 
Historically, this conflict can be traced back to the establishment of Israel in 1948 and the 
subsequent support given to Israel by the United States.  In recent years, the extremist groups 
have grown in number and have increased their efforts.  The most significant attacks against the 
United States during the past ten years have been led by fundamentalist extremist groups acting 
from remote locations such as Afghanistan, Lebanon, Yemen, Iraq, and Iran.  Extremism remains 
a clear and present threat to United States national security due to its recent history of attacks, its 
increasing ability to radicalize moderate Muslims living within the United States resulting in an 
ever expanding internal threat of “homegown” terrorists, and the religious devotion to their goal 
resulting in their refusal to negotiate or accept anything less than the complete and utter 
destruction of their enemies. 
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 Statement of the Problem 
 The first attack within the United States connected with Islam and extremism was the 
first bombing of the World Trade Center – February 26th, 1993, which killed 5 people.  During 
the ensuing investigation, several links were identified with fundamentalist groups in Egypt and 
resulted in indictments of Arab nationals living within the United States.  One of those 
responsible was a blind Sheik named Abdul Omar Rahman who was both a spiritual leader and 
scholar.  In 1980, two out of 64 groups were categorized as largely religious in motivation, but 
by 1995 almost half of the identified groups, 26 out of 56, were classified as religiously 
motivated; the majority of these groups espoused Islam as their guiding force.  (Moore, 2001, p. 
1)   
 Some characteristics that all terrorist organizations have in common are: They are 
political in their aims and motives; they use violence or the threat of violence in pursuit of their 
goals/objectives; and their actions are designed to have far reaching psychological repercussions 
beyond the immediate victim or target (having long lasting second and third order effects).  
(Howard, Sawyer, Bajema, 2008, pg. 33) The overall results of a terrorist attack are also similar: 
The loss of faith in social and governmental structure; safety and security are compromised and 
questioned; and the terrorist attack destroys solidarity, cooperation and interdependence on 
which social functioning is based and substitutes instead insecurity and distrust.  (Swanson, et al, 
2007, pg. 85)  
The most popular transnational terrorist threat currently facing the United States is Al-
Queda.  According to the July 2007 National Intelligence Estimate,  
“The main threat comes from Islamic terrorist groups and cells, 
especially al-Qa’ida, driven by their undiminished intent to attack 
the Homeland and a continued effort by these terrorist groups to  
adapt and improve their capabilities.  Al-Qa’ida is and will remain 
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 the most serious terrorist threat to the Homeland, as its central 
leadership continues to plan high impact plots, while pushing others 
in extremist Sunni communities to mimic its efforts and to supplement 
its capabilities.”  (National Intelligence Estimate, 2007, p. 6) 
 
 Al-Queda, which was led by Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawarahi, is a loose network of 
many different fundamental Islamic groups located in several different and diverse countries. Al-
Queda’s stated goal is to “re-establish the Muslim state throughout the world via the overthrow 
of corrupt regimes in the Islamic world and the removal of foreign presence – primarily 
American and Israeli – from the Middle East.”  (Moore, 2001, p. 5)  Their ideology is primarily 
based on the writings and teachings of Sayyid Muhammad Qubt and Ibn Wahhab, early Islamic 
scholars who called for a violent purification movement throughout the Middle East and greater 
Islamic world.  (Swanson, et al, 2007, p. 89)  This movement is commonly referred to as 
“Wahhabism.”  Followers of Wahhabism are fighting in a “Holy War” or “Jihad” which calls for 
every Muslim to join their fight against the West (United States).  In 1996, Osama Bin Laden 
issued a declaration of war against the United States calling us the “Great Satan” and later in 
1998 Bin Laden went on to state that it was the duty of all Muslims to kill United States citizens, 
civilian or military, and their allies.  (Moore, 2001. p. 5)  Since Osama Bin Laden’s declaration, 
Al-Queda has been responsible for several attacks against the United States including: the 1998 
suicide bombings of United States Embassies in Kenya & Tanzania which resulted in 224 dead, 
the 2000 suicide bombing of the U.S.S. Cole in Yemen which killed 17 American sailors, and 
most recently, the September 11, 2001 attack on the World Trade Center and Pentagon which 
resulted in more than 2,800 casualties.  (Swanson, et al, 2007, p. 89) 
Another Islamic terrorist group that the United States needs to be concerned with is 
Hamas.  Hamas is the largest and most influential Palestinian militant movement today and is 
primarily located in the Gaza Strip and West Bank.  The word “HAMAS” means “zeal” in 
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 Arabic, but it is also an Arabic acronym for “Harakut al-Muqawama al-Islamiya” or “Islamic 
Resistance Movement.”  Hamas is also a result of the Islamic Wahhabism movement.  Sheik 
Ahmed Yassin, its founder and spiritual leader, was assassinated by the Israeli government on 
March 22, 2004 after a prayer service he was attending in a Jerusalem Mosque.  (Swanson, et al, 
2007, p. 93)  Hamas is perhaps different from Al-Queda in that it is not only known for its 
violence, but also for its attempts to rebuild much of the social infrastructure within the 
Palestinian community.  While responsible for 90% of all suicide bombings throughout Israel 
during the past several years, Hamas is also responsible for building new roads, schools, and 
other social services in the territories of the West Bank and Gaza.  Hamas is responsible for the 
deaths of more than 500 people in more than 350 separate terrorist attacks since 1993.  Hamas is 
known for its use of suicide bombers, but not all of their attacks utilize this tactic.  (CFR Hamas, 
2007) 
Hezbollah, which means “Party of God,” is a terrorist organization found primarily in 
Lebanon, Syria, and Iran.  Its mission is to develop a “Pan-Islamic” republic throughout the 
Middle East and is supported by religious clerics in Iran.  The driving force behind this 
organization is the desired destruction of Israel and the liberation of Jerusalem which they feel is 
a religious obligation for all Muslims.  Its leader, Hassan Nasrallah, has effectively directed the 
organization since the first Israeli invasion into Lebanon in 1982 and has continued to rise in 
popularity among the Lebanese people. (Swanson, et al, 2007, p. 94)  Hezbollah is responsible 
for: the 1983 bombing of the Marine barracks in Beirut, Lebanon which killed 241 Marines, the 
1985 hijacking of TWA flight 847, and the 1996 bombing of Khobar Towers Air Force Housing 
Complex in Khobar, Saudi Arabia which killed 19 service members and wounded an additional 
374 individuals, including several local nationals.  (CFR Hezbollah, 2007) 
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 Although transnational terrorist organizations such as Al-Queda, Hamas, and Hezbollah 
continue to pose a significant threat to United States security, a more serious threat has recently 
emerged.  As expressed in an April 2009 article produced by the FDD’s Center for Terrorism 
Research, “Homegrown terrorists pose a particular concern due to the increasing number of 
Westerners joining militant Islamic movements, and the operatives’ familiarity with the societies 
they are targeting.” (Gartenstein-Ross & Grossman, 2009, p. 11)  The report identifies six 
indicators of Jihadist radicalization which can be observed in homegrown terrorists: The 
adoption of a legalistic interpretation of Islam, coming to trust only a select and ideologically 
rigid group of religious authorities, a perceived schism between Islam and the West, manifesting 
a low tolerance for perceived theological deviance, attempting to impose religious beliefs on 
others, and the expression of radical political views.  (Gartenstein-Ross & Grossman, 2009, p. 
18)  According to this report, over 200 men and women born or raised in the West have either 
participated in or provided support for extremist terrorist plots and attacks in recent years.  The 
report goes on to further identify four distinct phases that homegrown terrorists experience along 
their path to radicalization: Pre-radicalization, self-identification, indoctrination, and finally 
jihadization.  The pre-radicalization phase consists of the period before an individual begins their 
journey towards extremism and is followed by the self-identification phase which consists of the 
individual beginning to explore Salafi Islam and accepting a more extremist view of Islam.  The 
third step in the radicalization process involves “indoctrination” where the individual’s radical 
beliefs are intensified and the individual “wholly adopts Jihadi-Salafi ideology and concludes, 
without question, that the conditions and circumstances exist where action is required to support 
and further the Salafist cause.  That action is militant Jihad.”  (Silber & Bhatt, 2007, p. 36)  The 
final phase of the radicalization process is “Jihadization” and involves the individual’s 
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 acceptance of their duty to participate in Jihad and proclaim themselves as holy warriors or 
mujahedeen.  (Gartenstein-Ross & Grossman, 2009, p. 22) 
Examples of this radicalization process within the United States include: The Lackawana 
Six, The Portland Seven, and The Northern Virginia Paintball as well as individual homegrown 
cases such as John Walker Lindh, Adam Gadahn, and Daniel Joseph Maldonado.  The July 2007 
National Intelligence Estimate also assesses that, 
“The spread of radical – especially Salafi - Internet sites, increasingly 
aggressive anti-US rhetoric and actions, and the growing number of 
radical, self-generating cells in Western countries indicate that the  
radical and violent segment of the West’s Muslim population is 
expanding, including the United States.”  (National Intelligence 
Estimate, 2007)  
 
The intelligence estimate goes on to state that the arrest and prosecution of a small number of 
violent extremists within the United States points to the possibility that others are likely to 
follow the radicalization process and conclude that the use of violence here in the United States 
is both  legitimate and warranted.  This argument is echoed in the 2007 Council on Foreign 
Relations which states, “Experts say it is quite likely the next terrorist attack in the United States 
will not be the work of well-trained al-Queda operatives sent from abroad, but rather that of an 
American citizen.”  (CFR American Muslims, 2007) 
Although the majority of the homegrown terrorists identified in the United States have 
been radicalized Muslims, the United States runs the risk of alienating the American Muslim 
community through its attempts to combat homegrown terrorism.  In the case of the “Lackawana 
Six”, a group of Yemeni-Americans who attended a terrorist training camp in Afghanistan, it 
was the reports of suspicion from other American Muslims within the community which led to 
the initial government investigation and subsequent arrest of the six men plotting an assault on 
Fort Dix, New Jersey.  It is therefore imperative that the national strategy for combating the 
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 radicalization process of moderate Muslims includes civic engagement efforts.  (Gartenstein-
Ross & Grossman, 2009, p. 59)  Former Homeland Security secretary Michael Chertoff 
supported this technique when he stated, “An effective strategy to prevent and counter domestic 
radicalization requires that we not only engage these communities, but also take proactive steps 
to build trust and respond to issues of concern to Americans of different ethnicities, cultures, and 
faiths.”  (Gartenstein-Ross & Grossman, 2009, p. 60)   
 The process of radicalization proliferates in the United States through, “The internet, 
certain Salafi-based NGO’s, extremist sermons/study groups, Salafi literature, jihadi videotapes, 
extremist-sponsored trips to radical madrassas and militant training camps abroad have served as 
‘extremist incubators’ for young, susceptible Muslims.”  (Silber & Bhatt, 2007, p. 82-83)  To 
effectively combat this process, the United States must rely on moderate Muslim clerics and the 
American Muslim communities to identify at-risk younger Muslims and intervene with the 
radicalization process prior to their adoption of a fundamentalist or Salafi-based extremist view 
of Islam.  Unfortunately, if these young, susceptible Muslims are not identified and reached prior 
to their indoctrination into the Jihadi-Salafi agenda, they will most likely become a highly 
dangerous threat. 
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 Timeline of Recent Radical Extremist Significant Events: 
Below is a current timeline or recent history of Radical Extremist organizations and 
significant international events:  
1979 (Feb) Ayatollah Khomeni established the Islamic Republic of Iran; United States seen as a 
potential enemy of Islam and as being intrusive in Islamic affairs 
1983 (Apr) Bombing of US Embassy in Beirut; demonstrates the effectiveness of violence  
1983 (Oct) Bombing of US Marine barracks in Beirut  
1985 (Oct) Achille Lauro hijacking in eastern Mediterranean  
1989 (Feb) Last Soviet forces withdraw from Afghanistan; demonstrates the weakness of other 
Western Cultures and the ability of Islamic forces to win against a military super power  
1991 (Feb) Defeat of Saddam Hussein in Gulf War; demonstration of the United States 
willingness to wage war against an Islamic State  
1991 (Dec) Collapse of Soviet Union  
1993 (Feb) Omar Abdel Rahman, blind Egyptian sheik, helped guide and execute the First 
World Trade Center bombing; demonstrates the United States vulnerability to terrorist attacks  
1993 (Oct) Battle of Mogadishu, Somalia  
1996 (Jun) Khobar Towers bombing in Saudi Arabia  
1996 (Aug) Usama bin Laden issues fatwa Declaration of War against the Americans Occupying 
the Land of the Two Holy Places 
  
1998 (Feb) Usama bin Laden, Ayman al-Zawahiri, et al. issue World Islamic Front Declaration 
of Jihad against the Jews and the Crusaders  
 
1998 (Aug) US Embassy Bombings in Tanzania and Kenya  
2000 (Oct) USS Cole bombed in Yemeni port  
2001 (Jun) Al-Qaida and Egyptian Islamic Jihad complete merger  
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 2001 (Sep) 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks against the US  
2001 (Oct) Start of war in Afghanistan (Operation Enduring Freedom)  
2001 (Dec) Zawahiri publishes AQ manifesto Knights Under the Prophet’s Banner 
2002 (July) Egyptian gunman kills two Israelis and injures four at the El Al ticket counter at the 
Los Angeles International Airport  
 
2002 (Oct) Usama bin Laden releases letter To the Americans  
2003 (Mar) Start of war in Iraq (Operation Iraqi Freedom)  
2003 (Dec) Two assassination attempts against Pakistani President Musharraf 
2004 (Mar) Madrid train bombings  
2005 (Jul) London public transportation system bombings  
2006 (Mar) Man drives vehicle into pedestrians injuring nine at the University of North Carolina 
– Chapel Hill, NC  
 
2006 (Jun) Al-Qaida in Iraq leader Abu Musab al-Zarqawi killed in Iraq  
2006 (Aug) British foil alleged plot to detonate explosives on planes mid-flight to US  
2009 (Jun) Army Private William Long killed and two others injured in a shooting attack at the 
Army Navy Career Center, Little Rock, Arkansas. 
 
2009 (Nov) MAJ Nidal Hassan kills thirteen and injures another 30 at the Fort Hood Soldier 
Readiness Center in Ft. Hood, TX. 
 
2009 (Dec) Yemini terrorist attempts to detonate a bomb on a flight from Amsterdam to Detroit 
but the bomb only ignites; passengers and crew subdue the terrorist. 
 
2011 (2 May) Osama Bin Laden killed in Pakistan by American military forces. 
 
2012 (11 SEP) Attack on U. S. Consulate in Benghazi, which resulted in the death of 
Ambassador Chris Stevens, and three other Americans.   
  
This study will consist of a policy analysis aimed at identifying the critical elements from the 
current strategy which may be utilized to combat the extremist threat our nation is facing.   
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 Purpose of the Study 
 
 The purpose of this thesis is to conduct a qualitative analysis of the sources of extremism 
from two different perspectives (US government and local moderate Muslims), determine if The 
National Intelligence Estimate 2007 properly identifies the sources of Islamic extremism, and 
make recommendations on how to counter the sources of extremism/radicalization and improve 
US security and counterterrorism strategy.  The sample size for this study is small and far from 
being representative of the United States as a whole, but is intended to be suggestive in nature 
rather than probative.  The research questions which will guide this study include a primary 
research question and three secondary research questions. 
Research Questions 
The primary research question this thesis seeks to answer is: 
 1.  What are the primary sources of Extremism? 
In order to answer the primary question, secondary questions are needed to provide a complete 
review of the topic.  Secondary questions include: 
2.  What do the leading authors and so called “experts” say are the sources of extremism? 
3.  What do US government documents identify as the sources of extremism? 
 4.  What does the local Moderate Muslim population identify as the sources/causes of 
 extremism? 
10 
 Limitations and Assumptions 
This study assumes that the participants surveyed answered honestly.  The sample 
consists of members of a local Muslim community.  However, in qualitative research, 
assumptions may also constitute a limitation.  This study cannot determine the absolute 
truthfulness of the participants.  Despite the assurance of confidentiality, the members of the 
local community may alter their responses to avoid any perceived repercussions or negative 
judgments that may result from the study.  Identifying oneself as being anti-Israel or anti-Jewish 
could invite attack from militant Jewish groups.  Similarly, expressing antagonism towards 
American policy could be perceived by some American zealots as being anti-American and as a 
result lead to discrimination or anti-Islamic violence.  Furthermore, generalizations of the 
findings are limited because participants were selected from one particular Islamic Mosque in 
Mississippi and because of the qualitative nature of the research.  The findings should not be 
deemed representative of the entire American Muslim community.  Moreover, due to the lack of 
research, it is difficult for this study to compliment previous research.   
The methodology of this study utilizes a purposeful and convenient sample of 
individuals.  The sample of the local Muslim community will be used because they are easily 
identifiable as members of the Muslim population and are easily accessible.  This particular 
method of sampling potentially includes biases and opinions that are not representative of the 
larger Muslim population of the United States.  Potential flaws and limitations are inherent in 
particular instruments creating reason to be skeptical of the findings.  However, the present 
research is intended to serve as a basis for further research.  This study will aim to explore the 
perceptions of the participants because their opinion is important in the analysis of the current 
national strategy.  The collective opinion of the local Muslim community could also serve as a 
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 counter argument to the information provided in many of the literary sources which examine the 
Islamic community and which have served as a literary background to this study. 
The researcher attempted to mitigate the potential problems of the study by providing the 
participants an Information Letter that detailed the researcher’s intention to protect 
confidentiality and verifies voluntary participation.  The researcher believes this will increase 
honesty among the participants.  The researcher also provided both open ended and closed ended 
questions on the survey in order to ensure clarification and additional explanation opportunities 
for the participants to elaborate on issues they feel were not addressed by the survey questions.  
The additional comments provided by the participants were reviewed for reoccurring themes and 
included in the final report of conclusions as additional areas to guide future research. 
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 Definition of Key Terms 
Apostate. “One who has abandoned their religious faith, principles or cause.” (Johnson, 2007, p 
6)  This term is used to describe deserters from any religion.  
Globalization. “Process of becoming worldwide in scope.” (Johnson, 2007, p 6)  
Ideology. “A tightly knit body of beliefs organized around a few central values; examples 
include communism, fascism, and variations of nationalism.” (Kilroy, 2007, p 212) 
Irredentist Islamic extremist. “Subset of Islamic extremism; seeks to regain land ruled by non-
Muslims or under occupation.” (Johnson, 2007, p 7) 
Islamic extremism. “Individuals committed to restructuring political society in accordance with 
their vision of Islamic law and willing to use violence to achieve their goals; three types: 
irredentist, nationalist and transnational.” (Johnson, 2007, p 7) 
Islamism. “Islamic activism; three types: political, missionary and extremist.” (Johnson, 2007, p 
7)  
Islamist.  “Islamists are revolutionary in outlook, extremist in behavior, totalitarian in ambition.” 
(Pipes, 2002, p 40) 
Jihad. “Struggle; two types: individual internal struggle against evil and temptation, and holy 
war waged by Muslims against infidels.” (Johnson, 2007, p 7)  This is similar to the Christian 
desire for piety and devotion. 
Jihadist. “Muslim involved in a jihad (note: Islamic extremists often identify themselves as 
jihadists).” (Johnson, 2007, p 7) 
Militant Islam.  A utopian ideology initiated in the twentieth century, that attracts only a portion 
of Muslims (perhaps 10-15 percent), seeks to capture control of governments, and is nakedly 
aggressive toward all those who stand in its way, no matter what their faith.  (Pipes, 2002, p 3) 
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 Nationalist Islamic Extremist. “Subset of Islamic extremism; focus is on combating Muslim 
governments considered impious or apostate.” (Johnson, 2007, p 7) 
Terrorism. “Use or threat of use of seemingly random violence against non-traditional targets in 
order to instill a climate of fear so that the fear will induce political acquiescence and/or a 
political change in favor of those instigating the violence.”  (Kilroy, 2007, p 164)   
Transnational Islamic Extremist. “Subset of Islamic extremism; focus transcends national 
boundaries; also called global terrorists or global jihadists.” (Johnson, 2007, p 7) 
 
Summary 
This thesis presents the findings of the researcher as well as relevant and available 
literature.  The study also examines the perceptions of the local Moderate Muslim population in 
regards to the current government policies governing extremism and radicalization.  The findings 
of the survey will be analyzed and compared to the indicators of extremism and radicalization as 
identified by the governmental policies and other independent research as found in the literature 
review.   
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CHAPTER 2 
RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY 
Introduction 
The literature concerning Islamic extremism and radicalization is clear in expressing the 
complexity of the problem and the severity of this unique threat to the United States.  This study 
contributes to the research by examining and describing the perceptions of the local Muslim 
community and comparing their perspective of the problem with the perspective obtained from 
the prominent literature and published governmental policies regarding extremism and 
radicalization.  This chapter includes discussion: (a) population and sample, (b) methodology, (c) 
data collection and instrumentation, and (d) data analysis. 
The purpose of this qualitative study will be to explore the perceptions of local moderate 
Muslims and how they might differ from the perceptions obtained from prominent researchers, 
published governmental policies, and self-proclaimed or self-evidenced extremists themselves.  
The research questions which will guide this study are: 
 1. What are the primary sources of extremism? 
2. What do the leading authors and so called “experts” say are the sources of extremism? 
3. What do US government documents identify as the sources of extremism? 
 4. What does the local Muslim population identify as the sources/causes of 
 extremism? 
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 Population and Sample 
 For the analysis of the local Moderate Muslim population, this thesis studies the 
responses to survey questions administered to members of the local Muslim community.     
Data Collection and Instrumentation 
 This thesis uses qualitative analysis to answer the primary and secondary research 
questions. Further, it also uses textual analysis (i.e., document studies) to compare and contrast 
data from multiple perspectives.  To facilitate data reduction, data display, and drawing of 
conclusions, primary and secondary textual source materials will be grouped into three 
categories:  
 1. Prominent authors / Leading subject matter experts in the field  
 2. US government documents  
 3. Local Muslim perceptions  
 All data has been collected by the researcher.  The researcher has tried to remain 
objective and refrain from influencing survey responses.  Furthermore, the researcher has 
remained passive and has contributed as little as possible to the responses obtained through the 
distribution or administration of the survey.  Qualitative data has also been obtained through 
semi-structured interviews with the key leaders of the local Muslim community during the 
course of this study.  The population sample was chosen from a group of Muslims who regularly 
attend the local Islamic mosque Friday afternoon prayer service.        
 All participating surveys consisted of a cross sectional survey and additional information 
was obtained through one-on-one conversations with key leaders within the local Islamic 
community.  Specifically, key leaders of the Islamic community were helpful in helping edit the 
questions contained within the survey to ensure that the sensitive nature of the survey questions 
16 
 would not offend members of the local Muslim community.  Without the support of these key 
leaders within the Muslim community, the survey would not have been able to be administered.  
Indeed, even with the support of the Islamic leadership, a majority of the Islamic community 
appeared to be reluctant to participate in the study.  All participating individuals were asked the 
same closed ended questions in order to obtain quantifiable and easily coded information with an 
open ended section at the conclusion of the survey to capture any additional issues individuals 
may wish to express that were not covered in the closed ended question portion of the individual 
survey.      
Data Analysis 
 This study assembles a body of primary and secondary source materials. The source 
material will be divided into three groups: (1) Prominent leading authors in the field of study or 
leading subject matter experts, (2) United States governmental policies and other governmental 
supporting documents, (3) Results obtained through the analysis of surveys administered to local 
moderate Muslims and key Islamic leaders within the local area, which make up the three 
perspectives from which to compare and contrast data.   
Initially, a copy of the research proposal was sent to the Institutional Review Board 
(IRB) to review the intended research to ensure safety of the participants.  The researcher also 
provided the IRB with the purpose of the research, the intended sample, the methodology, and 
the potential risks involved for the participants.  Further, the IRB was provided with information 
describing how confidentiality will be maintained and a copy of the Informed Consent Form 
(later to be titled Information Letter) which was given to each individual prior to participating in 
the study.   
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  Upon approval of the IRB, individual surveys and informal interviews were conducted. 
Each survey was analyzed and examined for re-occurring themes.  The researcher then identified 
common themes which emerged from the data (surveys and interviews).  Further, to ensure 
consistency of analyzing the data, the findings were imported into a Microsoft Excel spreadsheet 
that will enable the researcher to organize the survey results in order to identify patterns.     
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CHAPTER 3 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Introduction 
 Extremism continues to be an ever present threat to our nation’s security and the United 
States must increase its efforts to diminish the ability of Jihadist groups such as Al-queda, 
Hamas, and Hezbollah from recruiting new militant members in the U.S. who are willing to 
attack their own nation.  In order to prevent moderate Muslims from radicalizing, it is important 
to involve senior leaders within the Muslim community.  The U.S. must be careful not to alienate 
or discriminate against the American Muslim community because they are the best eyes and ears 
our nation has for identifying at-risk moderate Muslims recruited for Jihad.  Local police forces 
will need to be vigilant in practicing good community policing and also using intelligence 
gathered from the senior Muslim leaders to help maintain good situational awareness of potential 
Muslim fundamentalist groups that are hostile to the U.S. and might be forming within their local 
communities.  Without these vitally important relations with the American Muslim community, 
the U.S. will continue to be subjected to extremist terrorist attacks.  This chapter presents a 
review of the literary sources used during this study and the different sources of extremism 
proposed by each in order to answer the secondary research questions.  Once this information 
has been examined, the thesis should have a solid foundation and be better able to answer the 
primary research question: What are the primary sources of extremism?    
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 Prominent Authors on Extremism 
 Bruce Hoffman provided a clear explanation of the unique challenges that extremist 
terrorism presents to the U.S. when he identified three key differences between Islamic terrorism 
and other secular forms of terrorism.  First, Islamic extremists reject all contemporary ideologies 
and see themselves as outsiders with no option but to resort to militant Jihad.  Next, as Jihadists 
fighting a holy war, total victory can only be obtained through the total destruction of the 
enemies of Allah and a return to an Islamic state governed by the rule of Shariah.  Finally, 
Islamic extremists believe that to kill the enemies of Allah and to offer the infidels the choice 
between converting to Islam or being put to death is the duty of every individual believer as well 
as the task of the Islamic state.  (Hoffman, 1993, pg. 4)  With this view of the extremists’ 
religious dedication and willingness to die for one’s religious conviction, there is no easy end to 
this ever increasing threat to U.S. security. 
Daniel Pipes, in his book Militant Islam Reaches America, argued that although a large 
percentage of the population (both Muslim and Christian) believe that militant Islam is a result 
of economic stress and poverty, such an explanation must be ruled out and the real cause of 
militant Islam must be found in some other variable.  Mr. Pipes supported his argument by 
examining the backgrounds of the nineteen suicide hijackers involved in the September 11th 
attacks.  The backgrounds of those terrorists included, “money, education, and privilege.” (Pipes, 
2002, pg. xiv)  Mr. Pipes goes on to further examine the life of John Walker Lindh who he 
described as a “young son of privilege who joined the Taliban in Afghanistan and charged with 
providing material support and resources to a foreign terrorist organization.” (Pipes, 2002, pg. 
xvi)  The author also addressed the difficult issue that governments have in formulating a policy 
on what at first appears to be a religion.  In order to help clarify the issue, Mr. Pipes drew a clear 
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 distinction between Islam, a religion, and militant Islam, a political ideology that he compared 
with fascism and Marxism-Leninism. (Pipes, 2002, pg. 47)  Mr. Pipes goes on to express that the 
U.S. government has an important, but difficult task in, “severing the common association 
Americans make between Islam and terrorism.  Officialdom does not deny that seemingly devout 
Muslims are constantly trying to kill Americans, but it vociferously denies their connection to 
Islam.” (Pipes, 2002, pg. 95)     
 The determination of the extremist is further expressed by a number of Shi’a 
theologians.  For example, Ayatollah Baqer al-Sadr wrote, “We have two choices: either to 
accept it with submission, which means letting Islam die, or destroy it, so that we can construct 
the world as Islam requires.”  (Hoffman, 1993, pg. 5)  Perhaps the most alarming message of the 
extremist’s intent was expressed by Hussein Mussawi, the former leader of Lebanon’s 
Hezbollah, when he stated, “We are not fighting so that the enemy recognizes us and offers us 
something.  We are fighting to wipe out the enemy.”  (Hoffman, 1993, pg. 5)  This devout 
determination in the pursuit of their goal causes the extremist to be the most deadly and difficult 
threat to guard against and defeat.  The issue was best explained by Mr. Bruce Hoffman when he 
stated, 
“The volatile combination of religion and terrorism has been cited as  
one of the main reasons for terrorism’s increased lethality.  The fact  
that for the religious terrorist violence inevitably assumes a transcendent 
purpose and therefore becomes a sacramental or divine duty arguably 
results in a significant loosening of the constraints on the commission  
of mass murder.  Religion, moreover, functions as a legitimizing force, 
sanctioning if not encouraging wide scale violence against an almost open- 
ended category of opponents.”  (Hoffman, 1993, pg. 12) 
 
In short, the goal of an Islamist is not to achieve an acceptable coexistence with the enemy, but 
the complete and utter annihilation of the enemy. 
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 Mark A. Gabriel’s book, Islam and Terrorism, portrays the Islamic faith, and more 
specifically the Islamic view of Jihad, as only a former cleric and professor of Islamic History 
can.  Dr. Gabriel offers valuable insight into not only the Islamic religion, but also the Muslim 
culture in an attempt to explain the motives and goals of Islamic extremist groups.  Furthermore, 
Dr. Gabriel’s experience as both a professor of Islamic history and an Imam of a local mosque 
(similar to a pastor of a Christian Church) gives a unique and personal account of the struggles 
he had with trying to reconcile the loving, peaceful, forgiving, and compassionate Islam that he 
was instructed to teach with the “true” Islam that he was familiar with from his study of the 
Quran.  (Gabriel, 2002, pg. 2-4)  During a Friday Islamic teaching at a local mosque in Giza, 
Egypt to a group of about two hundred and fifty Muslims, Dr Gabriel delivered the following 
message, 
 “Jihad in Islam is defending the Islamic nation and Islam against 
 the attacks of the enemies.  Islam is a religion of peace and only 
 will fight against one  who fights it.  These infidels, heathens, 
 perverts, Christians and Allah’s grievers, the Jews, out of envy  
of peaceful Islam and its prophet – they spread the myth that Islam 
 is promulgated by the sword and violence.  These infidels, the 
 accusers of Islam, do not acknowledge Allah’s words.” 
(Gabriel, 2002, pg. 1) 
 
This message caused an internal conflict within Dr. Gabirel because he had studied the 
Quran for years at Al-Azhar University and was instructed to focus on the politically correct 
Islam and purposely overlook the areas of Islamic teaching that conflicted with the authority of 
Egypt.  (Gabriel, 2002, pg. 2)  This “politically correct” version of Islam did not coincide with 
the Islam he had studied.  What confused him most was that while he was being instructed to 
teach a politically correct version of Islam, Muslim fundamentalists, who were practicing true 
Islam, were bombing churches and killing Christians.  Dr. Gabriel goes on to claim, 
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  “Allah, the god revealed in the Quran, is not a loving father.  It says that 
 he desires to lead people astray (Surah 6:39, 126).  He does not help  
 those who are led astray by him (Surah 30:29) and desires to use them to 
 populate hell (Surah 32:13)  Islam is full of discrimination – against women, 
 against non-Muslims, against Christians, and most especially against Jews. 
 Hatred is built into the religion.”  (Gabriel, 2002, pg. 5)  
 
As Dr. Gabriel struggled to understand the reasons for the two separate messages, he 
questioned a well-known Islamic cleric, Omar Abdel Rahman (the spiritual leader of the radical 
Egyptian group al-Jihad which carried out the assassination of Egyptian President Anwar Sadat), 
about the verses in the Quran that talk about love, peace, and forgiveness.  Omar Abdel Rahman 
replied, “there is a whole surah (chapter) called ‘Spoils of War.’  There is no surah called 
‘Peace.’  Jihad and killing are the head of Islam.  If you take them out, you cut off the head of 
Islam.” (Gabriel, 2002. pg. 24)   
Dr. Gabriel explains to his reader that Islam is a religion of works.  That is, entrance into 
Paradise (Heaven) must be earned.  According to the Islamic faith, when judgment day comes, 
Allah weighs the good works and the bad works in order to determine their fate.  “Then as for 
him whose balance (of good deeds) will be heavy, he will live a pleasant life (in Paradise).  But 
as for him whose balance (of good deeds) be light, he will have his home in Hawiyah (pit, i.e., 
Hell)” – Surah 101:6-9. (Gabriel, 2002, pg. 27)  This differs significantly from the Christian faith 
where one receives salvation through the acceptance of Jesus Christ and cannot earn God’s grace 
through works or deeds, but rather through faith.  This fundamental difference is key to 
understanding a Muslim’s willingness to fight Jihad or, more specifically, accept a suicide 
mission that will certainly result in his/her death.  Dr. Gabriel explains, “the only way for a 
Muslim to ensure that he will get into Paradise is to die in Jihad – to die while fighting the 
enemy of Islam.” (Gabriel, 2002, pg. 28)  Jihad is further explained as fighting anybody who 
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 stands in the way of spreading Islam or fighting anyone who refuses to enter (submit) to Islam 
(based on Surah 8:39) (Gabriel, 2002, pg. 28) 
The question still remains, “What about the Quranic verses that speak of love, peace, and 
forgiveness?”  Dr. Gabriel responds to this question by explaining to the reader the Islamic 
concept of “Nasikh.”  The principle of Nasikh is based on the fact that the Quran was revealed to 
Muhammad at different times throughout his life.  Over a period of about twenty-two years, the 
prophet Muhammad traveled from Mecca to Medina and the Quran is a result of the revelations 
he received during this time period.  The prophet Muhammad had a significantly different 
experience in Mecca than he did while he was in Medina.  Muhammad’s life in Mecca was all 
about prayers and meditation.  Therefore, the Quranic verses written while Muhammad was in 
Mecca are about peace and cooperation with others.  While in Medina, Muhammad became a 
military leader and invader.  Therefore, the revelations in Medina talk about military power and 
invasion in the name of Islam (Jihad).  (Gabriel, 2002, pg. 31)  The earlier, more peaceful and 
loving verses of the Quran which were written while the prophet was in Mecca, were superseded 
by more violent and militant verses which were written while Muhammad was in Medina.  The 
process of replacing the older verses with the more recent ones is known as the principle of 
Nasikh.  
Dr. Gabriel goes on to clarify for the reader that the ultimate goal of Islam is Jihad.  Jihad 
is carried out in order to establish Islamic authority over the whole world.  Dr. Gabriel further 
explains that Islam is not just a religion, it is a government as well. (Gabriel, 2002 pg. 37)  With 
this as the ultimate goal of Islam, one has to ask, “Why then are not all Muslims fighting this 
Jihad?”  Dr. Gabriel offers an explanation for this question by identifying three types of 
Muslims: Secular Muslims, Traditional Muslims, and Fundamentalist Muslims.  Dr. Gabriel 
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 describes the secular Muslims by stating that they “believe in the nice parts of Islam, but reject 
the call of Jihad.  They take on the cultural trappings of the message, but they are not living it out 
completely.”  Dr. Gabriel describes the Traditional Muslims as those who “study, believe, and 
practice Islam, but consider Jihad to be a spiritual battle or simply do not take action because 
they do not have the ability, they are concerned with their families, or they want to live a nice 
life on earth instead of dying.”  Finally, Dr. Gabriel describes the Fundamentalist Muslims as the 
Muslim extremists who perpetrate terrorism and their goal is, “to practice Islam as Muhammad 
did; they are practicing ‘true’ Islam.”  (Gabriel, 2002, pg. 39)   
Certain key verses from the Quran help to identify and demonstrate the violent nature of 
Islamic Jihad.  For example, Surah 9:5 states: 
 “Fight and slay the Pagans wherever you find them,  and seize them, 
 beleaguer them, and lie in wait for them in every stratagem (of war); 
 but if they repent, and establish regular prayers and practice regular  
 charity, then open the way for them: for Allah is Oft-forgiving,  
 Most Merciful.” (Gabriel, 2002, pg. 30)  
 
Other verses from the Quran that demonstrate this violent aspect of the Islamic faith 
include Surah 4:89 which proclaims, “Those who reject Islam must be killed.  If they turn back 
(from Islam), take (hold of) them and kill them wherever you find them…”  (Gabriel, 2002, pg. 
33)  Another verse which offers proof of violence in the Quran is Surah 8:59-60 which 
emphasizes, “Against them make ready your strength to the utmost of your power, including 
steeds of war, to strike terror into (the hearts of) the enemies, of Allah and your enemies, and 
others besides, whom you may not know, but whom Allah knows.”  (Gabriel, 2002, pg. 34)  It is 
interesting that this particular verse contains a clear reference to the intent of Islamic Jihad to 
“strike terror into the hearts of the enemies.”  This pattern of violent scripture is seen again in 
Surah 8:39 which states, “And fight them until there is no more Fitnah (disbelief and polytheism, 
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 i.e., worshiping others besides Allah) and the religion (worship) will be for Allah Alone [in the 
whole of the world].  But if they cease (worshipping others besides Allah), then certainly, Allah 
is All-Seer of what they do.” (Gabriel, 2002, pg. 35)  Finally, Muhammad’s instructions for 
waging Jihad and against whom this holy war should be directed are clearly found in Surah 9:29: 
 “Fight against those who (1) believe not in Allah, (2) nor in the last day,  
 (3) nor forbid that which has been forbidden by Allah and His Messenger 
 (Muhammad) (4) and those who acknowledge not the religion of truth 
 (i.e. Islam) among the people of the Scripture (Jews and Christians), until 
 they pay the Jizyah [tax] with willing submission, and feel themselves 
 subdued.  (Gabriel, 2002, pg. 73) 
 
These versus from the Quran provide very clear evidence of the violent nature of the 
Islamic faith and are intended to prove to the reader the inherent dangers of Islamic Jihad.  
However, are these passages significantly different from verses found in the Christian Holy 
Bible? 
The King James Version of the Holy Bible also contains similar scriptures of a wrathful 
and jealous God which seem to command violent action against the enemies of the faith.  For 
example, 2 Samuel 22:35; 38-41 reads:  
 “He teacheth my hands to war; so that a bow of steel is broken by mine 
 arms….I have pursued my enemies, and destroyed them; and turned not  
 again until I had consumed them.  And I have consumed them, and 
 wounded them, that they could not arise: yea, they are fallen under my 
 feet.  For thou hast girded me with strength to battle: them that rose up 
 against me hast thou subdued under me.  Thou hast also given me the  
 necks of mine enemies, that I might destroy them that hate me.” 
 (KJV, 1988, pg. 439-440) 
 
This passage is repeated in the book of Psalms 18:34-40.  Elsewhere in the Old 
Testament similar scriptures are found, such as Exodus 15:3 which proclaims, “The Lord is a 
man of war: the Lord is his name.”  Other similar passages which refer to war against the 
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 enemies of Israel and the complete destruction of its adversaries include Joshua 6:21, “And they 
utterly destroyed all that was in the city, both man and woman, young and old, and ox, and 
sheep, and ass, with the edge of the sword.”  The book of Deuteronomy echoes this theme in 
versus 13:15-16 and in 20:13-16.  These passages are very similar to the violent messages 
previously mentioned from the Quran.  In fact, some might argue that these versus could easily 
be interpreted as a “Christian” call to “Jihad.”  With these similarities between the Holy Bible 
and the Islamic Quran, how is it that Christians are not involved in a “holy war” against the 
Muslims of the world?  The answer is quite simple.  Just as the Islamic faith has the principle of 
Nasikh, where older versus are superseded by more recent scripture, the Holy Bible and 
Christian followers understand the difference between Old Testament and New Testament 
passages.  All of the previous examples of Biblical scripture are found in the Old Testament 
where the culture of Israel had to fight for its survival against numerous enemies.  The clear 
distinction between Islam and Christianity is that Islam seems to migrate from a peaceful 
religion to a more violent and militant lifestyle, whereas Christianity evolves from a violent past 
to a peaceful, loving, and forgiving religion with the arrival of the ministry of Jesus Christ and 
the New Testament. 
Similarities can also be observed between Islamic and Jewish terrorism.  A clear example 
of Jewish terrorist acts include Baruch Goldstein’s assault on Ibrahim’s mosque on 25 February 
1994, during the second Muslim Sabbath and Islam’s holy month of Ramadan, killing 29 and 
wounding 150.  (Howard, Sawyer, Bajema, 2009, pg. 209)  Another example of Jewish terrorism 
is the assassination of Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin by Yigal Amir, a young Jewish student, 
who claimed he had acted on orders of God.  (Howard, et al, 2009, pg. 209)  In fact, there are 
many similarities between the stands of the Jewish Kach and the Islamic Hamas organizations.  
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 These similarities include: Both share a vision of a religious state between the Jordon River and 
the Mediterranean Sea; both have a “xenophobia” against everything alien or secular which must 
be removed from the entire land (purification of the land of all things foreign or secular); both 
have a vehement rejection of western culture; and both rely not only on violence, but also a 
gradual building of an impressive constituency through a strategy of “re-Islamization” or “re-
Judaization” from below.  (Howard, et al, 2009, pg. 214)   
Dr. Gabriel’s argument of a violent Islamic faith which calls for/demands an offensive 
Jihad is contrary to Magnus Ranstorp’s idea of Islam’s Jihad as a defensive doctrine.  Whereas 
Dr. Gabriel describes an offensive Jihad aimed at the total destruction of non-Muslim states and 
world domination as its goal, Ranstorp argues that modern day Muslims are acting out of a sense 
of fear and feel threatened by the encroachment of western influence and secular governments of 
Christian societies, such as the U.S., into predominately Muslim lands.  Ranstorp expressed this 
fear best when he claimed,  
 “The accelerated dissolution of traditional links of social and cultural  
 cohesion within and between societies with the current globalization 
 process, combined with the historical legacy and current conditions of 
 political repression, economic inequality and social upheaval common 
 among disparate religious extremist movements, have all led to an 
 increased sense of fragility, instability, and unpredictability for the  
 present and the future.”  (Howard, et al, 2009, pg. 211)  
 
Ranstorp further explains that not only do Islamic terrorists feel the need to preserve their 
religious and cultural identity, they also see this time as an opportunity to fundamentally shape 
the future.  (Howard, et al, 2009, pg. 211)  Ranstorp continues to develop the “crisis mentality” 
in the Islamic terrorist’s mindset by describing the problem as being “multi-faceted.”  He claims 
that the Islamic terrorist is being affected in several areas, including the social, political, 
economic, cultural, psychological, and spiritual sphere.  This combination of influencers results 
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 in a sense of “spiritual fragmentation and radicalization of society and the extremist’s fear of the 
forced march toward one worldism.” (Howard, et al, 2009, pg. 211)  Ranstorp further argues that 
Islam’s Jihad is essentially a defensive doctrine which is somewhat contrary to what Dr. Gabriel 
presents in his book, Islam and Terrorism.  Ranstorp discusses Islam’s Jihad, which is 
sanctioned by leading Muslim theologians, as a fight against perceived aggressors, tyrants, and 
“wayward Muslims.”  Ranstorp goes on to explain that in its most violent form, Jihad is 
“justified as a means of last resort to prevent the extinction of the distinctive identity of the 
Islamic community against the forces of secularism and modernism.”  (Howard, et al, 2009, pg. 
212)  Ranstorp seems to differ with Dr. Gabriel’s assessment of the intention of Islamic Jihad by 
suggesting that the goal of Islamic extremists is not the establishment of a global Islamic state 
ruled by Quranic Muslim Law, but instead as a defensive struggle against the secular and 
cultural invasion of the western culture and Christian influence.  Ranstorp supports this theory 
when he states,  
 “With the loss of Palestine to Zionism, Islamic extremists drew heavily 
 on the symbolism and history of the crusades where Christianity was  
 pitted against Islam to explain their current condition of oppression and 
 disinheritance, and to provide a workable solution and defense against  
 the threat of western encirclement and secularization.” 
(Howard, et al, 2009, pg. 217) 
 
These two theories of the goal of Islamic Jihad are both credible and well supported by 
the two authors.  The question remains, “What is the true goal of Islamic Jihad?”  Is it an 
offensive holy war aimed at the establishment of a global Islamic state where Islamic law 
governs supreme?  Or is it a defensive battle to protect the Islamic culture from the perceived 
invasion of the west and the secularization which threatens the traditional Muslim culture and 
Islamic way of life?  The goal of Islamic Jihad is quite simply…both.  Islamic extremists are 
concerned with protecting the heart and soul of the Islamic faith from what they perceive as an 
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 external threat to their culture and way of life.  This is the immediate short term goal of the 
current Islamic Jihad we are seeing today.  The long term, or ultimate, goal of Jihad is the 
establishment of an Islamic state governed by the law prescribed within the Quran.  Within this 
Islamic state, there is no room for secular government or independent nation states.  These two 
viewpoints of Islamic Jihad are both mutually supportive and offer a comprehensive 
understanding of Islam and terrorism.  
Monte Palmer and Princess Palmer also discuss the causes, diversity and challenges of 
dealing with extremism in their book, Islamic Extremism.  In the first chapter of the book, the 
Palmers begin by trying to define the enemy in America’s struggle against terrorism.  The 
authors are quick to make the distinction that, “The jihadists might be Muslim, but few Muslims 
are jihadists”.  The authors also make a familiar statement when they point out that, “The 
American government denies that it is at war with Islam, but the world’s Muslims remain 
unconvinced.”  (Palmer, 2008, pg. 2)  The chapter goes on to state, “The Muslim world is 
acutely sensitive about threats to its faith regardless of their intent.  Attacks on Islam, however 
inadvertent, strengthen the forces of Islamic extremism.”  (Palmer, 2008, pg. 4)  The Palmers 
continue to discuss the modern perception of the world’s Muslim community when it provided 
the following information in Chapter 2,  
“A Times of London poll conducted shortly after September 11 found that 
approximately 11 percent of Britain’s two million Muslims believed that 
there was some justification for Bin Laden’s attacks on the United States; 
some 40 percent of the respondents disagreed with Bin Laden’s means but 
agreed that his war against the United States was justified.  Sixty-eight 
percent indicated that their faith was more important than “being British.” 
The results were based on interviews with 1,170 Muslims conducted 
outside British mosques.”  (Palmer, 2008, pg. 23) 
 
The discussion on the British Muslim perceptions continued with a proposed cause for 
extremism and the emergence of terrorist cells.  Most of the research that was conducted on 
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 causes for extremism resulted from, “Hostility toward the United States focused on American 
policy in the Middle East and particularly U.S. support of Israel.”  (Palmer, 2008, pg. 23)  This 
argument has been a reoccurring theme in most books published about modern terrorism and 
must be considered as an answer to one of the secondary research questions, “What do the 
leading authors identify as the sources of extremism?”  To make matters worse, American efforts 
to “win the hearts and minds” of the Muslim community have failed miserably and in much of 
the world America (or at least the American government) is seen as the “bad guys” and jihadists 
are viewed as “freedom fighters”.  (Palmer, 2008, pg. 24)  It is ironic that the U.S., which claims 
to be the beacon of Freedom and Liberty, is being attacked by extremists who view themselves 
as “Freedom fighters” trying to liberate their countries from American military occupation.  This 
issue is best illustrated when the book states: 
 “Americans see themselves as a fair and reasonable people who desire 
nothing more than freedom, justice, and prosperity for all.  As the innocent 
victims of criminal violence, Americans believe that they are justified in 
striking the terrorists with maximum force.  In their view, their hands are 
free of blood.  The image of the United States that prevails in the Islamic 
world is radically different.  Not only is the United States seen as having 
blood on its hands, but those hands are literally dripping in the blood of 
Arabs and Muslims.”  (Palmer, 2008, pg. 28-29) 
  
 The authors conclude their discussion on the world’s Muslim perceptions of the United 
States by stating, “The United States will not be successful in countering terrorism and Islamic 
extremism unless it can do a better job of convincing people that America has not declared war 
on Islam.  It would also do well to reconsider its support of oppressive regimes in the Islamic 
world.  All fuel anti-Americanism and anti-Americanism strengthens the jihadists.  (Palmer, 
2008, pg. 31) 
 The question of how we are to deal with extremism remains.  According to Philip 
Heymann in his book, Terrorism and America, there are three primary concerns for democratic 
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 nations dealing with terrorism: the preservation of life, the preservation of liberties necessary to 
a vibrant society, and the maintaining of the unity of society.  (Heymann, 1988, p. iv)  It was 
interesting to note that Mr. Heymann did not list the destruction of the terrorist organization 
within his primary concerns.  In fact, Mr. Heymann went on to argue that Prime Minister 
Benjamin Netanyahu’s goal of, “Dealing with terrorism as unitary – the destruction of a deeply 
evil activity and those who practice it – and who see the primary means to that destruction as 
simply unleashing the security forces of a powerful state” is not the correct course of action to 
take.  (Heymann, 1988, p. x)  Mr. Heymann argued that terrorist organizations must be 
confronted on a political battlefield as well as incorporating a military or police action response.  
This argument further supported the using of civic engagements and establishing a strong 
cooperative relationship with senior leaders within the local Muslim communities. 
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 Governmental Documents 
 The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, March 2006 (NSS) states 
that, “The War on Terror has been both a battle of arms and a battle of ideas – a fight against the 
terrorists and against their murderous ideology.”  (NSS, 2006, pg. 9)  This governmental 
document goes on to clarify that: 
  “While the War on Terror is a battle of ideas, it is not a battle of religions. 
The transnational terrorists confronting us today exploit the proud religion 
of Islam to serve a violent political vision: the establishment, by terrorism 
and subversion, of a totalitarian empire that denies all political and religious 
freedom.  These terrorists distort the idea of Jihad into a call for murder 
against those they regard as apostates or unbelievers – including Christians, 
Jews, Hindus, other religious traditions, and all Muslims who disagree with 
them.  Indeed, most of the terrorist attacks since September 11 have occurred 
in Muslim countries – and most of the victims have been Muslims.”  (NSS, 2006, pg. 9)   
 
It is important to note that the National Security Strategy of 2006 stresses that the U.S. is NOT 
in a War against the religion of Islam.  Unfortunately, many of the World’s Muslims do not 
agree.  Extremist groups use the U.S. recent Foreign Policy decisions, our long history of 
supporting Israel, and our military involvement in the Islamic countries of Iraq and Afghanistan 
to argue that the U.S. IS at war with Islam.  This is a huge problem that this country will have to 
address if there is any hope in winning the war on terror.   
 The NSS of 2006 also identifies the causes of terrorism and extremism while also 
identifying what does not cause individuals to join extremist organizations.  First, the NSS 
discusses four commonly proposed sources of terrorism: 
1. The inevitable by-product of poverty 
2. A result of hostility to U.S. policy in Iraq 
3. A result of Israeli-Palestinian issues 
4. A response to our efforts to prevent terror attacks 
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 These four “sources” of terrorism are commonly expressed as possible causes for the extremism, 
but the NSS of 2006 offers fairly compelling evidence that these are NOT part of the root cause 
of terrorism.  The report argues that because many of the hijackers responsible for the September 
11 attacks were from middle-class families, their decision to follow an extremist ideology could 
not be a product of poverty. The report also reminds the reader that the leader of Al-Qa’ida, 
Osama Bin Laden, came from a privileged upbringing which further demonstrates that poverty 
does not lead to extremism.  The NSS of 2006 continues to point out that the U.S. has been at 
war with terror long before the war in Iraq and Saddam Hussein.  A brief look at our nation’s 
recent history with terrorism will indicate that terrorism existed long before our hostility in Iraq 
and therefore our military action in Iraq is not a cause of extremism (although our continued 
military involvement in Muslim nations may provide extremist groups a source for recruiting 
young Muslims to participate in a defense of Islamic Holy land).  While extremism pre-existed 
the Iraq War (and our support of the Shah of Iran), these events continue to be a cause of present 
and future recruiting for extremist organizations.   
Next, the National Security Strategy of 2006 addresses the possibility of extremism as 
being a result of the never-ending Israeli-Palestinian conflict.  The report does not go into much 
detail on this argument and only provides a short one sentence answer to this potential cause of 
extremism.  The report states, “Al-Qaida plotting for the September 11 attacks began in the 
1990’s, during an active period in the peace process.”  (NSS, 2006, pg. 10)  This is not sufficient 
evidence to discount the Israeli-Palestinian issue with the rise of extremism.  The issue of the 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict is addressed in several prominent authors’ books as a leading cause of 
extremism and it is also echoed in the survey results that will be analyzed later in this study.  
 The NSS of 2006 concludes its discussion of false causes of extremism by addressing the 
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 argument that extremism is simply a response to our efforts to prevent terrorist attacks.  Here 
again, the report uses a historic timeline to refute this cause and effect argument.  The report 
states, “The al-Qaida network targeted the United States long before the United States targeted 
al-Qaida.  Indeed, the terrorists are emboldened more by perceptions of weakness than by 
demonstrations of resolve.  Terrorists lure recruits by telling them that we are decadent and 
easily intimidated and will retreat if attacked.”  (NSS, 2006, pg. 10)  This answer also demands 
further discussion.  Extremists would, no doubt, argue that the United States was responsible for 
“targeting” Islamic nations by engaging in a military occupation of the Muslim Holy lands.  
The NSS of 2006 does provide four alternative origins for the radicalization of an 
otherwise peaceful religion: 
1. Political alienation 
2. Grievances that can be blamed on others 
3. Sub-cultures of conspiracy and misinformation 
4. An ideology that justifies murder 
The first cause, political alienation, argues that extremists are recruited from populations which, 
“Have no voice in their own government and see no legitimate way to promote change in their 
own country.”  (NSS, 2006, pg. 10)  The report states that this poor political environment causes 
the people of these countries to be vulnerable to manipulation by extremist groups and their 
violent ideology which advocates political change through violence and destruction. 
 The second cause, grievances that can be blamed on others, claims that, “The failures of 
the terrorists feel and see are blamed on others, and on perceived injustices from the recent or 
sometimes distant past.  The terrorists’ rhetoric keeps wounds associated with this past fresh and 
raw, a potent motivation for revenge and terror.”  (NSS, 2006, pg. 10)  This argument tends to 
35 
 blame extremists for “living in the past” and acting out of an emotional response to “perceived 
injustices.” 
 Next, the 2006 NSS claims that extremism stems from sub-cultures of conspiracy and 
misinformation.  Here again, the report claims that extremist groups are made up of populations 
whose world view is, “Contaminated by falsehoods and corrupted by conspiracy theories.”  
(NSS, 2006, pg. 10)  Basically, the report argues that extremist groups ignore facts that would 
challenge their prejuditial outlook and refuse to see things for how they are, but instead prefer to 
focus on popular self-serving propaganda and see the world as they wish to see it. 
 The final cause that the 2006 NSS claims contributes to extremism is an ideology that 
justifies murder.  The report argues that, “Terrorism ultimately depends upon the appeal of an 
ideology that excuses or even glorifies the deliberate killing of innocents.  A proud religion – the 
religion of Islam – has been twisted and made to serve an evil end, as in other times and places 
other religions have been similarly abused.”  (NSS, 2006, pg. 10)  This last cause for extremism 
focuses directly on the ability of the extremists to justify their violent actions with their religious 
views.  In order for a Muslim to condone suicide attacks and the targeting of a civilian 
population, he/she must ascribe to an extremist ideology.  Most Muslim communities and 
religious leaders would argue that anyone who accepts this extremist ideology is not a true 
Muslim; conversely, an extremist would argue that any Muslim who refuses to support the 
current Jihad or defense of Islam is not a true Muslim.  Therefore, a primary issue within the 
Muslim community seems to be the question of whether or not a jihad has been declared against 
the U.S. and if so, whether or not they should answer the call if indeed the religion of Islam is at 
war with the U.S.  The final question to be considered by the Islamic community is if a Jihad has 
been declared, what are a Muslim’s “Rules of Engagement?”  Even if a Muslim is engaged in 
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 military action in the defense of Islam, many Muslims would argue that the targeting and killing 
of civilians is not supported by the teachings of the Koran or Muhammad (Peace Be Upon Him).  
This would also be an important religious topic for future discussion and study.        
This 2006 National Security Strategy therefore provides the answer to one of our 
secondary research questions by providing what the government views as the causes of 
extremism.  The 2006 NSS argues that democracy and a well-established government will help 
solve these problems.  As the document states, “Transnational terrorists are recruited from 
people who have no voice in their own government and see no legitimate way to promote change 
in their own country.  Without a stake in the existing order, they are vulnerable to manipulation 
by those who advocate a perverse vision based on violence and destruction.”  (NSS, 2006, pg. 
10)   
 Once the causes of terrorism and extremism were identified, the NSS then communicated 
a strategy for combating these issues.  According to the 2006 NSS, the key to defeating the 
extremists rests on the leaders of the Islamic faith.   
“The strategy to counter the lies behind the terrorists’ ideology is to empower 
the very people the terrorists most want to exploit:  the faithful followers of Islam. 
We will continue to support political reforms that empower peaceful Muslims 
to practice and interpret their faith.  The most vital work will be done within the 
Islamic world itself, and Jordon, Morocco, and Indonesia have begun to make 
important strides in this effort.  Responsible Islamic leaders need to denounce 
an ideology that distorts and exploits Islam for destructive ends and defiles a 
proud religion.” (NSS, 2006, pg. 11)   
 
The National Security Strategy of the United States of America closes with a vision statement 
for the way forward, “The struggle against militant Islamic radicalization is the great ideological 
conflict of the early years of the 21st century and finds the great powers all on the same side – 
opposing the terrorists.”  (NSS, 2006, pg. 36) 
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 A second governmental document, the National Intelligence Estimate, July 2007 (NIE) 
specifically addresses the terrorist threat to the US homeland.  The NIE of 2007 anticipated a 
“persistent and evolving terrorist threat” with the main threat coming from “Islamic terrorist 
cells, especially Al-Qa’ida, driven by their undiminished intent to attack the homeland.”  (NIE, 
2007)  The report continues by stating that Al-Qa’ida will remain the most serious threat to our 
nation’s security and it’s central leadership will continue to plan high impact attacks while 
encouraging other extremist Sunni communities to do the same.  The 2007 NIE also provides a 
frightening picture of our current security situation when it states, “Although we have discovered 
only a handful of individuals in the United States with ties to Al-Qa’ida senior leadership since 
9/11, we judge that Al-Qa’ida will intensify its efforts to put operatives here.”  (NIE, 2007)  This 
statement indicates that there are already foreign extremists operating within our borders and 
already established within our communities.  How many more have entered the country since the 
2007 NIE was published?   
The 2007 NIE also assesses that the Lebanese Hezbollah will continue to threaten 
homeland security, especially if the group perceives the U.S. as posing a direct threat to Iran.  
Finally, the 2007 NIE concludes by stating, 
“We assess that the spread of radical – especially Salafi – internet sites, 
increasingly aggressive anti-US rhetoric and actions, and the growing number 
of radical, self-generating cells in Western countries indicate that the radical 
and violent segment of the West’s Muslim population is expanding, including 
in the United States.  The arrest and prosecution by US law enforcement of a 
small number of violent Islamic extremists inside the United States – who are 
becoming more connected ideologically, virtually, and/or in a physical sense 
to the global extremist movement – points to the possibility that others may 
become sufficiently radicalized that they will view the use of violence here 
as legitimate.”  (NIE, 2007) 
 
This closing statement clearly identifies the issue of “radicalization” of moderate Muslims to a 
more extremist view or ideology as a persistent threat to the U.S. homeland security.  The threat 
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 discussed here is an “internal” issue that suggests that American Muslims could be at risk of 
converting to a more militant strain or radical ideology of Islam.  Here again it is important to 
acknowledge the importance of the key leadership of the Islamic community in preventing a 
distorted view of Islam and protecting the Islamic youth from being swayed to a violent ideology 
or perversion of the Islamic faith.  Government intrusion into the Islamic faith will not help 
prevent radicalization; in fact, government intrusion can only be seen as a threat to American 
Muslim’s freedom of religion.  The U.S. government must trust the Islamic leaders to police 
their own community.        
 Finally, the last governmental document that is included in the Literature Review is the 
National Security Strategy published in May 2010 (NSS, 2010).  The National Security Strategy 
of 2010 is very different from the NSS published just four years earlier (NSS, 2006).  While the 
2006 NSS described our current war on terror as a “battle of ideas, not a battle of religion,” 
discussed the four causes of extremism, and closed by stating our current struggle against 
“militant Islamic radicalization” was the great conflict of the 21st century, the NSS of 2010 goes 
one step further by not mentioning the words, “radicalization”, “Muslim”, or “Islam” even once 
in the entire 52 page document.  The 2010 NSS identified Weapons of Mass destruction as the 
primary threat to the security of the U.S. where the 2006 NSS stated that terrorists and their 
murderous ideology presented the greatest threat.  The 2010 NSS also spends a great deal of time 
discussing the importance of the economy, environment (climate change), and our countries 
dependence on fossil fuel.  The 2010 NSS only briefly mentions “extremism” when it states, 
“We must focus American engagement on strengthening international institutions 
and galvanizing the collective action that can serve common interests such as 
combating violent extremism; stopping the spread of nuclear weapons and securing 
nuclear materials; achieving balanced and sustainable economic growth; and forging 
cooperative solutions to the threat of climate change, armed conflict, and pandemic 
disease.”  (NSS, 2010, pg. 3)         
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The 2010 NSS also acknowledges a commitment to reach a compromise in the Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict by stating,  
 “We will be unwavering in our pursuit of a comprehensive peace between Israel 
 and its neighbors, including a two-state solution that ensures Israel’s security,  
 while fulfilling the Palestinian peoples’ legitimate aspirations for a viable state 
of their own.  And our broader engagement with Muslim communities around 
the world will spur progress on critical political and security matters, while 
advancing partnerships on a broad range of issues based on mutual interests 
and mutual respect.”  (NSS, 2010, pg. 4) 
 
This new position of compromise may be received by the Islamic nations as a commitment by 
the United States to pursue a peaceful solution to the extremist problem and a willingness to 
work with extremist groups such as Hamas and Hezbollah to find common ground and declare a 
truce, but it may also be viewed as a weakening of our resolve.  The 2010 NSS goes on to 
discuss our ongoing effort to fight terrorism by stating, 
“The United States is now fighting two wars with many thousands of our men and 
women deployed in harm’s way, and hundreds of billions of dollars dedicated to funding these 
conflicts.   In Iraq, we are supporting a transition of responsibility to the sovereign Iraqi 
Government.  We are supporting the security and prosperity of our partners in Afghanistan and 
Pakistan as part of a broader campaign to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al-Qa’ida and its violent 
extremist affiliates.  Yet these wars – and our global efforts to successfully counter violent 
extremism – are only one element of our strategic environment and cannot define America’s 
engagement with the world.  Terrorism is one of many threats that are more consequential in a 
global age.”  (NSS, 2010, pg. 8) 
 
There is no mistaking the difference in tone between the 2006 and 2010 National 
Security Strategies published only four years apart.  Indeed, the 2010 NSS seems to be more 
concerned with the state of the nation’s economy, environmental issues such as climate change, 
and our dependence on fossil fuels than it does with terrorism.     
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 Summary of Literature Review 
 Extremism continues to be an ever present threat to our nation’s security and the U.S. 
must increase its efforts to diminish the ability of Jihadist groups such as Al-queda, Hamas, and 
Hezbollah from recruiting new militant members willing to attack their own nation.  Mr. 
Hoffman provided a clear description of the unique problem extremism presents to the U.S.  Mr. 
Hoffman explained how the extremists’ rejection of contemporary ideologies leaves them with 
no option other than militant Jihad.  Mr. Hoffman also indicated that for these extremists, total 
victory can only be obtained through the total destruction of the enemies of Allah and a return to 
an Islamic state governed by the rule of Shariah.  Finally, he argued that extremists believe that 
the destruction of the enemies of Allah is the duty of every individual believer as well as the task 
of the Islamic state.  This unique threat was supported further by Ayatollah Baqer al-Sadr when 
he expressed that Muslims had only two choices: to allow Islam to perish or destroy the western 
influence which threatens Islam.  Perhaps the most alarming message of the extremist’s intent 
was expressed by Hussein Mussawi when he stated, “We are not fighting so that the enemy 
recognizes us and offers us something.  We are fighting to wipe out the enemy.”  Dr. Gabriel 
also offered a different perspective by discussing the issue from a former Islamic Cleric’s 
perspective.  Dr. Gabriel identified the inherent violence within the Koran and argued that the 
roots of terrorism have been at the core of Islam since the prophet Muhammad received the first 
verses of the Koran in about 610 A.D.  (Gabriel, 2002, p. x)  Finally, Mr. Heymann argued that 
terrorist organizations must be confronted on a political battlefield as well as incorporating a 
military or police action response.  Mr. Heymann’s argument suggested using more civic 
engagement activities and establishing stronger cooperative relationships within the local 
41 
 Muslim communities in order to facilitate a better understanding of the root causes of extremism 
and radicalization. 
 This chapter has presented a review of what has been written about the subject of 
extremism and has highlighted the sources identified by various leading authors and 
governmental documents.  To further the understanding of extremism, this study will explore the 
perceptions of local moderate Muslims regarding the current governmental policies and opinions 
of the “so called experts” surrounding the issue of extremism and the process of radicalization.  
Once the participants were identified and agreed to participate in the study, each individual 
completed a survey which attempted to assess the attitudes and concerns of the local Muslim 
community in comparison with the expressed concerns of the governmental policy.  The survey 
consists of mostly multiple choice questions which ask the individual to rate how strongly they 
agree or disagree with certain expressed concerns from the governmental policies and will also 
contain a short open ended portion where participants will be asked to add any comments or 
concerns they have regarding the issue of extremism and the radicalization issue that was not 
addressed by the questions contained within the survey.  A copy of the survey and data results is 
provided in Appendix A of this thesis.  The collected data should help reveal the perceptions of 
the local moderate Muslim community as well as additional concerns not specifically addressed 
by the survey.  Chapter 4 will discuss the difficulties this researcher faced while attempting to 
conduct this study as well as a summary of the survey results and how they compare to the 
governmental documents and subject matter experts discussed in the Literature review.
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CHAPTER 4 
ANALYSIS 
Introduction 
The literature concerning Islamic extremism and radicalization clearly expressed the 
complexity of the problem and the severity of this unique threat to the United States.  This study 
contributes to the research by examining and describing the perceptions of the local Muslim 
community and comparing their perspective of the problem with the perspective obtained from 
the prominent literature and published governmental policies regarding extremism and 
radicalization. 
Challenges Experienced in Administration of Survey 
 The administration of the survey to the local Muslim community presented some unique 
challenges.  First, the survey questions themselves contained questions that many within the 
local Islamic community found offensive.  The subject of terrorism and extremism linked with 
the Islamic faith made for a very controversial topic and several members of the local Islamic 
community were reluctant to participate in the study.  Several meetings were held with a senior 
member of the local Mosque to review the proposed survey questions and ensure that the 
questions were not overly offensive to the local Muslim community, but the topic itself remains 
a volatile subject, difficult to address without appearing to cause members of the local Muslim 
community to become defensive.  After several weeks of meeting with a local leader within the 
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 Muslim community and adhering to his advice on how to best structure the questions, the survey 
was finally ready to be administered.   
Even with the support of the local leadership, a majority of the Muslim population 
appeared to be unwilling to participate in the study.  However, those that did participate provided 
some very strong opinions on the subject of extremism and the religion of Islam.  In general, it is 
likely that people with a strong or intense view are more likely to respond to a survey than 
people who are less involved.  For example, people who are ardent liberals or conservatives are 
more likely to respond to political surveys than the “silent majority.”  A copy of the survey 
questions and results is located in Appendix A at the end of this study.  Also, although three 
separate Muslim leaders sent out e-mail messages to the members of the local mosque requesting 
that they participate in the study, responses to the survey were few in number.   
Data Collection and Summary of Results 
 The collection of survey results provided a clear picture of the perceptions of the local 
Muslims who agreed to participate in the study.  It is important to remember that these results are 
only representative of a small percentage of the local Muslim community that participated in the 
study and cannot be used to predict the perceptions or opinions of the local Muslim population as 
a whole.  However, the information provided by the study does make for some interesting 
observations. 
 Although one of the key objectives of our current National Strategy is to ensure the 
Muslim world that the United States is not waging a war against Islam, according to the results 
of the survey it appears that 17% (3 of the 18 participants) of the local Muslims believed that 
America is engaged in a religious war against Islam.  Only 61% (11 of the 18 participants) 
believed that the current United States war is not focused on religion.  This observation begs the 
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 question, if 17% of local American Muslims believe that the United States is in fact waging a 
religious war against Islam, how many more Muslims living outside the United States (and our 
unique view of the world through American news stations) consider our country at war with 
Islam?  After all, the majority of news reported in the Islamic world comes from Al-Jazira news 
and portrays a very different message from the one portrayed in the American media.   
When asked whether or not American Foreign Policy was a contributing factor to the 
existence of international extremist groups, a large portion (67%) of participants answered 
“Yes.”  This is also the same percentage (67%) of individuals who believed that Al-Queda 
attacks are a result of American military involvement in the Muslim world.  Furthermore, 61% of 
the local Muslim population surveyed indicated that political differences such as the United 
States being too involved in the affairs of other countries with 50% of the respondents going on 
to cite a more specific reason (the United States’ support of Israel) as the most likely cause for 
extremist attacks against the United States.  The survey results clearly indicate that the local 
American Muslim community believes that American foreign policy is more responsible for the 
existence of extremist groups than foreign propaganda or other influences.  This perception 
(regardless of whether the perception is accurate)must continue to be addressed by the United 
States if it is going to avoid a continued growth of extremist groups surge in violent attacks.   
 When asked what they believed was most responsible for Radicalization or caused a 
person to take up an extremist ideology, half of the local Muslim community that participated in 
the survey answered that poor political decisions made by American politicians which negatively 
impacted the Muslim community and caused resentment led to Radicalization while only 17% 
answered that anti-United States media and propaganda such as Al-Jazira and extremist Salafi 
literature or Jihadi videotapes were the likely cause.  This was a very different approach to 
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 determining the root cause of extremism than the views expressed by the governmental 
documents (2007 National Intelligence Estimate) examined which claimed that the extremist 
propaganda and extremist literature were a strong influence on the process of radicalization.  Of 
course, the United States government would want to avoid negative views of recent political 
decisions / policies and instead place responsibility on the individuals who engage in the 
proliferation of extremist ideology.  Perhaps the truth lies somewhere in the middle of these two 
theories with both the United States recent political decisions and the spread of an extremist 
view of Islam through propaganda and Salafi literature being responsible for the increase in 
extremist ideology.  
 The results of the survey also indicated that an overwhelming majority (89%) of the local 
Muslim community thought that the United States was not justified in its invasion of Iraq in 
2003.  A slightly smaller percentage (56%) of the local Muslim population surveyed indicated 
that they believed that the United States was not justified in invading Afghanistan after the 
attacks on September 11th 2001.  These views are most likely similar to the rest of the current 
American population, but are arguably different from the Muslim communities living outside the 
United States who again receive their news through a different media network.   
 When asked about the use of violence against American civilians or military forces, an 
overwhelming 100% of the local Muslims indicated that violence against any civilian population 
was un-acceptable, but only 33% believed that violence against United States military (serving 
overseas) was unacceptable in response to the American government’s actions in the Muslim 
world.  While 33% of the participants believed that violence against the American military was 
unacceptable, 39% indicated that the military was a legitimate target for a violent response.  In 
addition, 28% of the local Muslim community were undecided marking “I don’t know” when 
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 asked the question.  The results of these two questions provided some interesting points to 
consider.  First, the unanimous agreement that violence against a civilian population was an 
unacceptable action and not supported by the local Muslim community in any form supports 
Islam as a peaceful religion and that extremist groups who resort to terrorist attacks against a 
civilian population do not receive support from the Islamic community regardless of how the 
extremist groups market their attacks as being in support of Islam.  Second, the strong belief by 
the local Islamic community condemning violent attacks against a civilian population should 
serve as a guide to military leaders when considering future “Rule of Engagement” criteria and 
military operations that take place in Urban terrain near large civilian populations.  This 
observation is supported later in the survey when 78% of the local Muslim population responded 
that they did not believe that any civilian casualties would be worth the death or capture of a 
high ranking terrorist such as Osama bin Laden or other Al-Qaida leader.  It is also important to 
note that this percentage might have been even higher, but three individuals who participated in 
the survey chose not to answer this question.   
Summary and Conclusions 
This chapter analyzed the results of the survey in order to compare the answers provided by the 
local Muslim community to the opinions provided by the leading authors and the information 
found within the governmental documents discussed earlier in the Literature Review.  The 
results of the survey provided for some interesting observations and also provided a different 
approach to trying to understand the complex issue of extremism.  Based on the research and 
answers to the secondary questions, the analysis suggests that there exist numerous causes or 
influencers that lead to extremism.  While leading authors and governmental documents suggest 
Salafi Literature, extremist propaganda, etc. as being a leading cause in the growth of extremist 
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 groups, the local Islamic community views the recent governmental foreign policy as the 
primary cause of the surge in extremist groups and activity.  Chapter 5 will expand on this 
conclusion as well as make several recommendations for action and further study.        
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CHAPTER 5 
 
 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
Introduction 
 
The purpose of this thesis was to conduct a qualitative analysis of the sources of 
extremism from multiple perspectives, determine if the current National Security Strategies and 
governmental policies properly identify the sources of extremism, and make recommendations 
on how to counter the sources of extremism and improve United States security and 
counterterrorism strategy.  This chapter draws conclusions from the analysis conducted in 
Chapter 4 and makes recommendations on how to improve national security efforts, 
counterterrorism strategy, and suggest additional research that can continue to add to the 
understanding of the extremist threat.  This chapter is organized into four parts: introduction, 
conclusions and recommendations, areas for further study, and conclusion. 
Conclusions and Recommendations 
Listed below are two conclusions and recommendations reached after the analysis of the 
literature review and survey results.   
1.  Extremist Ideology and Moderate Muslims.  Both the literary review and the results 
gathered from the analysis of the survey indicate that there is a clear distinction between the 
extremist ideology and what is believed, taught, and practiced in the local Muslim community.  
The common association most Americans make between Islam and terrorism is a dangerous 
misconception and can lead to additional problems rather than a solution to the extremist threat.    
Recommendation:  The United States must continue to reassure the Muslim community (both in 
words and in action) that the war on terror is not a war against Islam.  In addition to the 
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 responsibility of our government to reach out to the local (and international) Islamic community, 
The Muslim community must also become more involved in helping to manage American’s 
perception of the Islamic faith by being willing to discuss openly the issue of terrorism and 
extremism without fear or becoming overly defensive of their faith.  The controversial issue of 
terrorism and its perceived association or link to the Islamic faith needs to be addressed before a 
united effort can be established among both Muslims and non-Muslims to combat an extremist 
ideology and radicalization of impressionable youth.   
2.  Extremism and National Policy  Both the literary review and the results obtained from the 
analysis of the survey results clearly indicate that American Foreign Policy (specifically the 
Israeli-Palestinian Issue) is a primary source, and some argue the birth or nucleus, of extremist 
activity.  Research also suggests that our continued military presence in traditional Islamic 
countries and our recent military actions in Iraq and Afghanistan have resulted in an escalation 
of the problem more than it has to combat the issue of extremism.  Unfortunately, the political 
environment is a difficult, complex arena with multiple variables influencing the decision 
making process and there is not a simple answer or formula available to mitigate this central 
problem.  
Recommendation:  The nation’s foreign policy must be careful not to alienate the international 
Muslim community by making hasty decisions which can be perceived as hostile towards Islam.  
Any hostile action perceived by the international community will only add to the extremists’ 
ability to influence young moderate Muslims toward a more violent ideology.  Therefore, every 
decision on foreign policy must be evaluated from an Islamic point of view and we must be able 
to defend our intent in terms of combating extremist actions while avoiding the appearance of 
aggression against the Islamic faith or people.  Furthermore, based on the overwhelming 
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 response to the survey questions involving civilian casualties, the United States military will 
need to continue to issue strict rules of engagement when operating in an urban environment. 
The military must manage the perception of the local population and international Islamic 
community to ensure that any civilian casualties are viewed as a result of extremist action; not 
American military action.  If extremist organizations can use civilian casualties (or inappropriate 
military actions reported in the media) to highlight their cause, it will aid in their recruitment 
efforts and continue to strengthen the resolve of those who support an extremist ideology. 
Further Study 
 Additional literary sources are available for future study and comparison as well as other 
Muslim communities.  Specifically, it would be interesting to compare the survey results of the 
small sample size obtained here in a small southern town in Mississippi with a similar size 
sample from a larger metropolitan area.  Additionally, it would also be interesting to compare the 
survey results taken from the local Islamic community and compare them to a similar size 
sample of non-Muslim Americans to see what differences can be identified.   
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 Age of Participant:  
18-21 2 / 11%;    22-30  6 / 33%;    31-40   6 / 33%;     >40  3 / 17%;    N/A 1 / 5%  18 Total  
 
Gender:   
Male 15 / 83%    Female     2 / 11%    N/A    1/ 5% 
 
Citizenship:   
USA   6 / 33%    Other    11 / 61%    N/A (No Answer) 1/ 5%  
 
Survey Questions:  -  Please circle the answer that best represents your opinion.  If you feel 
uncomfortable answering a question, then please feel free to leave it blank and proceed to the 
next question.  Participants may stop taking the survey at any time.  Thank you for your 
participation in this study. 
 
1.  Please rank (1-3) the following according to your personal priorities in terms of how they 
relate to your personal identity (1 being the highest priority/importance and 3 being the lowest 
priority/importance). 
 
____  Religion  (13 / 72% Ranked as #1; 4 / 22% Ranked as #2; 1 / 5% Ranked as #3) 
____  Family  (3 / 17% Ranked as #1; 12 / 66% Ranked as #2; 2 / 11% Ranked as #3  w/ 1 
N/A) 
____  Country (American/Patriotism)  (2 / 11% Ranked as #1; 1 / 5% Ranked as #2; 14 / 78% 
Ranked as #3 w/ 1 / 5%  N/A) 
 
2.  Do you consider yourself: 
 
A.  0%     An Extremist 
B.  8 / 44%      A Moderate Muslim (a practicing Muslim who claims Islam as their faith, 
but does not dedicate 100% of their life to following their faith). 
C.  10 / 56%    A Devout Muslim, (a practicing Muslim who has dedicated 100% of their 
life to following their faith, but without extremist viewpoints.) 
 
3.  Is the American government at war with the religion of Islam? 
A.  3 / 17%     YES (America is engaged in a religious war against Islam). 
B.  11 / 61%  NO  (America is engaged in war in Islamic countries, but not against the 
religion of Islam). 
C.  4 / 22%     I don’t know  
 
4.  Can a good Muslim be a good American? 
A.  18 / 100%  YES 
B.  0 / 0%    NO  
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 5.  Do you believe that radical extremists hijacked planes and flew them into buildings on 9/11? 
A.  7 / 39%  YES 
B.  3 / 17%  NO 
C.  8 / 44%  I don’t know 
 
6.  Do you believe that the U.S. government / administration had advance knowledge of the 9/11 
attacks, and either organized the attacks or allowed the attacks to occur? 
 
A.  3 / 17%  YES 
B.  4 / 22%  NO 
C.  11 / 61%  I don’t know.  It is possible 
 
7.  Do you believe that American Foreign Policy is a contributing factor to the existence of 
International Extremist groups such as Al-Queda? 
 
A.  12 / 67%  Yes 
B.  3 / 17%  No 
C.  3 / 17%  I don’t Know 
 
8.  Do you believe that Al Qaeda is an Extremist terrorist organization trying to attack America? 
 
A.  12 / 67%  YES 
B.  1/ 5%   NO 
C.  5 / 28%  I don’t know 
 
9.  Do you believe that Al Qaeda is attacking America because Al Qaeda hates American 
freedoms? 
 
A.  0 / 0%  YES 
B.  13 / 72%  NO 
C.  5 / 28%  I don’t know 
 
10.  Is Al Qaeda attacking America because of American military involvement in the Muslim 
world? 
 
A.  12 / 67%  YES 
B.  2 / 11%  NO 
C.  4 / 22%  I don’t know 
 
 
 
 
 
 
11.  Is it justifiable for the U.S. government to do any of the following in an attempt to prevent 
terrorist attacks in America: 
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- taking religion and ethnicity into account as one factor when deciding whom to interview and 
search at airports? 
 
A.  1 / 5%  YES B.  16 / 90%  NO C.  1 / 5%  I don’t know 
 
- monitoring activities at American mosques? 
 
A.  1 / 5%  YES  B.  15 / 83%  NO C.  1 / 5%  I don’t know (1 N/A) 
 
- listening to phone calls of people in America whom the government claims are connected in 
some way with Al Qaeda? 
 
A.  1 / 5%  YES  B.  6 / 33%  NO C.  11 / 61%  Depends on the strength / evidence  
 
- having an informer pretend to support or encourage violence against America, to see if the 
targeted Muslims will decide to attack American targets? 
 
A.  0 / 0%  YES B.  6 /  33%  NO C.  11 / 61%  Depends on amount of evidence 
collected 
 (1 N/A) 
 
- monitoring Muslim charities in America, in the hopes of preventing funding for possible 
terrorist attacks?  
 
A.  2 / 11%  YES B.  13 / 72%  NO C.  3 / 17%  I don’t know 
 
12. Which of the following reasons is the most likely cause for Extremist attacks against the 
United States? 
 
A.  0 / 0%  Religious Differences – Christianity V. Islam, Jihad, or Holy War 
B.  11 / 61% Political Differences – United States too involved in the affairs of other 
countries 
C.  0 / 0% Cultural Differences – Westernization and U. S. influence on traditional 
Islamic values. 
D.  9 / 50%  Specific Reason – United States support of Israel 
E.  5 / 28%  Uncertain / I don’t know   
 
(Note:  This question had several individuals who chose multiple responses.) 
 
 
 
 
13.  Which of the following do you feel is most responsible for Radicalization or causes a person 
to take up an Extremist ideology? 
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 A.  3 / 17% Anti-U.S. media/propaganda such as Al-Jazira & extremist Salafi 
literature or jihadi videotapes propaganda.   
B.  9 / 50% Poor Political decisions made by American politicians which negatively 
impact the Muslim community and cause resentment. 
C.  1 / 5%  Personal attacks made against family members or feelings of resentment 
that stem from being outcast due to religious beliefs. 
D.  3 / 17%  All of the above 
E.  2 / 11%  I don’t know 
 
14. Have you ever visited an Islamic Mosque that supports an extremist ideology or could 
present a potential threat to the security of the United States? 
 
A. 0 / 0%  YES  B.  11 / 61%  NO C.  7 / 39%  No such Mosque exists 
 
If Yes, Was the Islamic Mosque: 
A.  Inside the United States 
B.  Outside the United States 
C.  18 / 100%  N/A (Not Applicable) 
 
15. If you, or a member of your family, have been questioned by the federal government at 
any time after 9/11, how were you treated during the interview? 
 
A.  1 / 5%   TREATED WELL 
B.  0 / 0%  TREATED BADLY 
C.  17 / 94%  Not Applicable – Have not been questioned by government authorities. 
 
16.  Was America justified in invading Iraq in 2003? 
 
A.  0 / 0%  YES 
B.  16 / 89%  NO 
C.  2 / 11%  I don’t know 
 
17.  Was America justified in invading Afghanistan after 9/11? 
 
A.  2 / 11%  YES  
B.  10 / 56%  NO 
C.  6 / 33%  I don’t know 
 
 
 
 
18.  Is violence against American civilians acceptable, in retaliation for the American 
government’s actions in the Muslim world? 
 
A.  0 / 0%  YES 
B.  18 / 100%  NO 
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 C.  0 / 0%  I don’t know 
 
19.  Is violence against the American military overseas acceptable, in retaliation for the 
American government’s actions in the Muslim world? 
 
A.  7 / 39%  YES 
B.  6 / 33%  NO 
C.  5 / 28%  I don’t know 
 
20.  Is violence by Muslims against the American military in the U.S. acceptable, in retaliation 
for the American government’s actions in the Muslim world? 
 
A.  1 / 5%   YES 
B.  15 / 83%  NO 
C.  2 / 11%  I don’t know 
  
21.  Is violence by Muslims against American government officials acceptable, in retaliation for 
the American government’s actions in the Muslim world? 
 
A.  1 / 5%   YES 
B.  16 / 89%  NO 
C.  1 / 5%  I don’t know 
 
22.  If you learned about a plot to attack targets inside America, would you tell law enforcement 
authorities? 
 
A.  18 / 100%  YES 
B.  0 / 0%  NO 
C.  0 / 0%  I don’t know 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
23. American military action sometimes results in civilian casualties.  What do you think is 
an “acceptable” civilian casualty rate when mounting a military attack against a High Value 
Target (such as Osama Bin Laden or other Al-Qaida leader)? 
 
A.  14 / 78% None “0” – I do not believe that any civilian casualties are worth the death 
or capture of a high ranking terrorist. 
B.  0 / 0%  Less that 5 civilian casualties  
C.  0/ 0%  Between 6 - 12 civilian casualties 
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 D.  1 / 5% More than 12 – As long as the Terrorist Leader is captured or killed, the 
civilian casualties, although regrettable, are a necessary cost we must 
accept to end the war on Terror. 
 
(Note:  3 individuals chose not to answer this question or mark N/A). 
 
24.  Do you feel that an individual or small group can be justified in targeting and/or killing 
civilians to help them achieve their goal?  Note: Unlike the question above where civilian 
casualties were an unfortunate “collateral damage” to the primary military operation, this 
question refers to the deliberate targeting of civilians as the objective of the military and not as a 
consequence or unfortunate collateral damage during a raid on a military or political target. 
 
A.  18 / 100%  Targeting civilians can never be justified. 
B.  0 / 0%  Targeting civilians can sometimes be justified. 
C.  0 / 0%  Targeting civilians is always justified – All is fair in war. 
 
25.  In your opinion, about what percentage of Muslim Mosques in this country are at risk for 
teaching an extremist ideology or creating Muslim Extremists that might pose a potential threat 
of Domestic Terrorism to this country? 
 
A.  12 / 67% 0% - There is no threat of a Muslim Mosque teaching Islamic Extremism 
or posing a threat of Radicalization and producing a Domestic Terrorism. 
B.  5 / 28% Less than 10% - no more than a Christian Church teaching a Radical form 
of Christianity and producing a Domestic Terrorist. 
C.  0 / 0%  Between 10 – 25% 
D.  0 / 0%  More than 25%   
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 VITA 
 
MAJ Scott M. Caldwell 
260 County Road 418 
Oxford, MS  38655 
(662)202-6054 
caldwell@olemiss.edu 
 
EDUCATION: 
Civilian Education - 
BA, English, University of Mississippi, 1993 
 
Military Education – 
Basic Training, FT Jackson, SC     1991 
Armor Officer Basic Course, FT Knox, KY    1994 
Unit Movement Officer Course, FT Eustis, VA   1998 
Total Army Instructor Trainer Course, Camp Shelby, MS  2002 
Infantry Captains Career Course, FT Benning, GA   2004 
Combined Arms Exercise (CAX), Millington, TN   2006 
Military History Instructor Course, FT Leavenworth, KS  2007 
Inspector General Course, FT Belvoir, VA    2008 
 
CIVILIAN 
1996-2006:  Teacher (English/Spanish), Oxford High School 
2006-2007:   Recruiting and Operations Officer, University of Memphis 
2007-Present: Assistant Professor of Military Science, University of Mississippi 
 
MILITARY 
Mississippi Army National Guard, Oxford, Mississippi 
1999-2001:   Platoon Leader, A Co. 2/198th AR, Oxford, MS/ Task Force Rifles SFOR X 
Bosnia-Herzegovina 
 -  Deployment to Bosnia-Herzegovina in support of Task Force Rifles SFOR X 
rotation.   
 
2000-2002:   Executive Officer, HHC 2/198th AR, Senatobia, MS  
- Coordinate administrative and logistical support for HHC and corresponding 
companies; took command in absence of the commander; supervise internal 
security; track maintenance and supply issues; and coordinate with battalion staff. 
 
2002-2004:   TAC Officer, 4th GSB RTI, Camp Shelby, MS 
- Teach, Assess and Council Officer Candidates in the Art and Science of Military 
Leadership.  Evaluated Leadership potential and performance while teaching 
skills such as:  Military Tactics, Land Navigation/Terrain Association, Troop 
Leading Procedures/Operation Order Process, etc.   
 
2004-2006:   Commander, A Co. 2/198th AR, Oxford, MS/Operation Iraqi Freedom III,  
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 An Najaf, Iraq   
- Provide leadership for a company of 78 soldiers deployed in support of 
Operation Iraqi Freedom III to An Najaf, Iraq from 2004-2006.  Duties include: 
leading, planning, directing and supervising company operations; guiding the unit 
in carrying out all missions; establishing unit policies and procedures; 
establishing and maintaining operations security; initiating and ensuring unit 
safety program is followed; ensuring unit readiness is maintained at all times; 
performing periodic inspections to ensure unit readiness; stress principles of 
accountability and maintenance; instruct and cross-train subordinates; 
maintaining soldier strength; ensuring proper training is conducted as needed. 
 
2006-2007:   TAC Officer, 4th GSB RTI, Camp Shelby, MS  
- Teach, Assess and Council Officer Candidates in the Art and Science of Military 
Leadership.  Evaluated Leadership potential and performance while teaching 
skills such as:  Military Tactics, Land Navigation/Terrain Association, Troop 
Leading Procedures/Operation Order Process, etc. 
 
2007-2012:   Inspector General, 184th ESC, Laurel, MS    
- Serves as the Deputy Inspector General to the Adjutant General.  Responsible 
for assisting the Inspector General in monitoring the morale, welfare, and 
discipline of the Mississippi Army and Air National Guard consisting of over 
13,000 Guardsmen.  Reports on the discipline, efficiency, economy, morale, 
training and readiness throughout the command.  As required provides assistance 
to assigned soldiers, airmen, civilians, and family members. Conducts general and 
special inspections, performs inquiries and investigations, and serves as a teacher 
and trainer on a wide variety of military related topics.  Responsible for 
identifying systemic issues and addressing them with the appropriate 
organizations/staff agencies. Coordinates with the DOD, DA, and AF Inspector 
General Offices on IG related matters.  Supervise and monitor the work of two 
Assistant IG's. 
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US DECORATIONS / BADGES: 
Mississippi War Medal 
National Defense Service Medal (2nd Award) 
Army Service Ribbon 
Army Achievement Medal (3rd Award) 
Army Reserve Component Achievement Medal (3rd Award) 
Army Commendation Medal 
Armed Forces Reserve Medal with M device (2nd Award) 
Armed Forces Expeditionary Medal 
NATO Medal 
Overseas Service Ribbon 
Global War on Terrorism Service Medal 
Iraq Campaign Medal 
Combat Action Badge 
Bronze Star Medal 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
